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Abstract
The research of Dr. Bent Flyvbjerg in the 1990s and early 2000s showed that urban rail 
projects often cost more than estimated and carried fewer riders than projected, a 
troubling trend suggesting that the forecasts for urban rail projects were too optimistic in 
terms of cost and ridership. Inspired by that research, this analysis seeks to extend that 
framework to analyze Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). A study of forecast vs. actual costs and 
ridership was conducted for 19 BRT projects in the United States. From this, it was found 
that the cost projections for these projects tended to be quite accurate, but ridership 
projections tended to be quite inaccurate and showed a clear tendency towards an 
optimism bias. As BRT becomes a more common choice for rapid transit investment in 
the US, this analysis suggests that current ridership forecasting methods still leave much 
to be desired.
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Introduction
When it was published, the research of Dr. Bent Flyvbjerg illustrated a consistent 
inaccuracy of urban rail transit project forecasts in regards to cost and ridership. 
Compared to road and highway projects, which showed a relatively even distribution 
in terms of inaccuracy between those projects that overestimated and underestimated 
the costs and usership of the finished project, urban rail projects were consistently 
projected under the actual cost and above the actual ridership. Based on these findings, 
Flyvbjerg called for greater accountability over forecasts of large-scale transportation 
projects (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005).
In the past several years, BRT has become an increasingly common choice for city 
and local governments when investing in rapid transit. At a time when many transit 
agencies are experiencing budget cuts and service reductions, the relatively low capital 
costs of BRT make it an attractive option for transit agencies looking to expand their 
rapid transit services. In 2014 alone, there were 24 BRT projects completed or under 
construction in the US (Freemark 2014).
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Compared to the megaprojects and urban rail projects that Flyvbjerg studied, these 
BRT projects seem relatively inexpensive. But for many small and mid-size American 
cities, a BRT project may represent one of the most significant investments in public 
transportation in that community’s history. As such, it is just as important that planners 
strive for accuracy when projecting cost and ridership.
Much has been written about the characteristics of BRT and the current state of BRT 
development, and there is a substantial body of research regarding the economic and 
development impacts of a BRT system, but there is much less research regarding BRT 
ridership and cost forecasts. Also, although there is a large body of work on travel 
forecasts, most obviously Flyvbjerg’s research, most of it pertains specifically to freeway 
or urban rail megaprojects. Given the growing interest in BRT systems among local 
governments and transportation professionals, this is a gap in the current research.
Literature Review
There is a large and growing body of research on BRT, most of which generally fits 
into one of three categories: the basic characteristics of BRT, the current state of BRT 
development, and the economic and development impacts of BRT. In each of these 
categories, there is much research comparing the characteristics and impacts of BRT to 
those of other forms of rapid transit, particularly light rail.
A substantial amount of work has been written about the service characteristics of 
urban transportation modes, including BRT, and this work offers useful parameters 
for defining BRT systems and the opportunities for its development. This research 
attempted to define the level of service characteristics at which point a system can 
be considered “bus rapid transit” and found that BRT is growing in popularity due to 
its cost effectiveness and the fact that it can be adapted for use in conventional bus 
systems (Vuchic 1992; Jarzab et al. 2002; Levinson et al. 2002). Additionally, the Institute 
for Transportation Policy (ITDP), a non-profit organization that provides technical 
assistance on public transportation projects and advocates for BRT development, has 
developed a ranking system for comparing BRT systems and determining whether a 
system meets their standards for what can be considered “true” BRT (Weinstock et al. 
2011). This research proved useful for understanding the characteristics of BRT and what 
could, even nominally, be considered as such.
Flyvbjerg’s work served as a model for this work. Building on a body of work from 
the 1990s and early 2000s, his research examined the accuracy of cost and ridership 
forecasts for large transportation projects, particularly urban rail and road projects, and 
found that urban rail projects frequently exhibited large cost overruns and typically 
presented very optimistic ridership forecasts compared with road projects, due, in part, 
to poor forecasting methods and to biases on the part of the forecasters to promote rail 
projects (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005); however, none of Flyvbjerg’s work dealt with bus transit 
projects. More recently, the work of Robert Bain has contributed significantly to this 
field of research, calling to attention widespread inaccuracy and optimism bias in traffic 
forecasts for toll road projects (Bain 2009).
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Another resource dealing with cost and ridership projections was a series of before-and-
after studies conducted by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regarding transit 
projects that have received New Starts funding (FTA 2006–2016). These studies also 
document a tendency to underestimate final construction costs, with the accuracy of 
ridership projections varying widely. However, these studies deal mostly with urban and 
commuter rail projects, with only a couple of bus transit projects included. This general 
lack of attention towards cost and ridership projections for BRT projects is a gap in the 
current literature.
Methodology
Funding and ridership information is collected by FTA, but most of this information 
deals with transit agencies as a whole rather than individual infrastructure projects. In 
cases in which cost and ridership estimates from the transit agency operating the BRT 
system were unavailable, the necessary information was obtained from media articles 
and government reports. BRT systems in operation in the US for which reliable and 
comparable data were not available are not included in this analysis. In total, 19 projects 
were included in the final analysis.
The methodologies Flyvbjerg employed in his research served as a guide for this 
research. Many projects go through multiple forecasts that change as a project moves 
forward through the design and construction phases. In his research, Flyvbjerg used 
the project forecasts from the time of the decision to build, arguing that this is the 
information available to decisionmakers when they agree to move forward on a project 
and, thus, are the most influential in determining the worthiness of a project. These 
figures were then compared to the actual figures from the completion of the project to 
determine their accuracy (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005). This is, in brief, what was attempted in 
this analysis, using figures as close to the time of the decision to build as were available.
Given the small number of what the ITDP would refer to as “true” BRT systems in the 
US—that is, systems that have all or nearly all of the features of BRT, such as dedicated 
lanes, pre-boarding payment, limited stops, and branded service—this analysis also 
includes some so-called “BRT-lite” systems (those with only a few of the features of 
BRT) and busway projects to produce a statistically-significant sample of BRT projects. 
Although not all of these systems fall into what the ITDP would deem “true” BRT, they 
do all represent significant investments in public transportation for each of the cities 
included here, so their value for an analysis of BRT cost and ridership projections should 
not be dismissed.
Individual Case Studies
Note that all dollar values are adjusted to values in the year of expenditure.
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Cleveland, Ohio
The HealthLine is a 7.1-mile BRT line operated by the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit 
Authority (GCRTA). It opened in October 2008 and features exclusive bus lanes and 
median stations for 4.4 miles of the line, with the remaining 2.7 miles using mixed-traffic 
curb lanes and sidewalk stops. The HealthLine also uses distinctive station structures, 
off-board fare equipment, signal priority for vehicles at traffic intersections (FTA 2012). 
ITDP gave the HealthLine the highest ranking of any BRT system in the US, indicating 
that they consider it the most complete example of BRT in the US (Weinstock et al. 
2011).
Projected capital costs for the HealthLine were $273.4 million according to a 1995 
estimate; however, further revisions set estimates ranging from $248.2 million to $317.4 
million. Due to cost-effectiveness requirements to receive federal funding, GCRTA 
trimmed costs for design elements and vehicle procurement and used management 
tools to monitor the project budget (GCRTA 2012). In the end, the actual capital costs 
were $197.2 million (GCRTA 2012).
Projected ridership for the HealthLine initially was 21,100 average weekday trips, 
although this later was revised to 13,500 (FTA, 2012). Actual ridership on the line was 
14,300 average weekday trips as of 2012, well below the initial projection. At the time 
of opening, Cleveland was in the midst of a substantial contraction of the regional 
economy and a subsequent drop in system-wide transit ridership, which fell by 22% 
between 2007 and 2010 (FTA 2012). This may go some way towards explaining why the 
actual ridership was so far below early estimates.
El Paso, Texas
The Brio Mesa Corridor is an 8.6-mile BRT-lite line operated by Sun Metro. Completed 
in October 2014, the Mesa Corridor route was the first of four planned Brio routes 
scheduled to open within the coming years and is currently the only rapid transit 
service in El Paso (Sun Metro 2014). The line features branded and landscaped stations, 
pre-boarding fare payment, and traffic signal priority.
Projected capital costs for the line were $27.08 million (FTA 2010), with actual capital 
costs reported at $27.1 million (Sun Metro 2014). Projected ridership initially was 11,900 
average weekday boardings within the opening year (FTA 2010), but this was revised to 
around 3,000 riders per day prior to Brio’s opening. Actual ridership was below even this 
lowered revision, with 52,000 average monthly boardings as of July 2016 (Wilcox 2016), 
an average of about 2,000 riders each operating day (Brio currently operates only six 
days per week).
Escondido, California
The Breeze Rapid is a 6-mile BRT-lite service operated by the North County Transit 
District (NCTD). Service began in June 2011 and features queue jump lanes at select 
intersections, traffic signal priority, bus station improvements, and branded service.
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Projected capital costs for the system were $2.79 million, according to a NCTD 2006 
concept study, with actual capital costs at $4.21 million. The Breeze Rapid came in over 
budget due, in large part, to revised plans for one intersection, at which a proposed 
queue jump lane was extended that required widening of the roadway for a full block to 
accommodate the new lane.1 
No formal ridership projection for the service was conducted; as the first instance of a 
rapid bus service in the region, the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG), 
the regional planning agency for San Diego County, treated it as a technology and 
concept demonstration that upgraded an existing local bus route rather than a project 
to significantly boost ridership.2 
Eugene, Oregon
The Emerald Express (EmX) is a BRT system operated by the Lane Transit District (LTD). 
An initial 4-mile segment opened in January 2007, with a 7.8-mile extension opening in 
January 2011. The EmX uses dedicated bus lanes for nearly 60% of its route, with a traffic 
signal priority system and branded stations with raised platforms, pre-boarding fare 
payment, and real-time bus arrival signs. The system has been noted as a BRT success 
story by the ITDP (Weinstock et al. 2011), constructed within budget and with ridership 
exceeding stated expectations.
Projected capital costs were $24.6 million for the initial segment and $43.1 million for 
the extension. These proved to be reasonably accurate, with actual capital costs being 
$24.6 million for the initial segment and $41.3 million for the extension.3 
It was projected that the served corridor would see an increase of 40% over the first 20 
years of service. In fact, there was a ridership increase of 63% in the corridor over the 
first year of service and 122% over the first four years. The 2011 extension was projected 
to increase ridership along the EmX line by 3,700 additional weekday boardings. After 
completion, the extension reached 80% of this projection within one year and exceeded 
it in the second year of service. Currently, weekday ridership averages 10,000+ during 
the school year and exceeds 11,000 in some months, 135% of the estimate predicted for 
the line after completion of the extension.4 
Fort Collins, Colorado
MAX is a 5-mile BRT line operated by Transfort. The line opened in May 2014 and 
features a dedicated transit-only busway for most of the route, branded service, pre-
boarding fare payment, and platform-level boarding at all stations along the route.
1 Information obtained through personal communication with D. Veeh, December 30, 2013.  
2 Ibid.
3 Information obtained through personal communication with A. Vobora, February 8, 2014.
4 Ibid.
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Projected capital costs for the system were $81.98 million (FTA 2009), with actual capital 
costs coming in at $86.83 million (Duggan 2014). Projected ridership was 3,900 average 
weekday boardings (FTA, 2009). MAX managed to exceed this figure after its first year of 
service, with 4,680 average daily boardings in September 2015 (de la Rosa 2015).
Grand Rapids, Michigan
The Silver Line is a 9.8-mile BRT-lite service operated by the Interurban Transit 
Partnership. The line opened in August 2014 and features stations with a sidewalk 
snowmelt system, next bus signage, platform-level boarding, pre-boarding fare payment, 
and designated bus-only travel lanes along portions of the route during peak weekday 
travel periods.
Projected capital costs were $37 million (FTA 2010), with actual capital costs being $40 
million (Krietz 2014). Projected ridership was 7,200 average weekday boardings in the 
first year (FTA 2010). Actual ridership fell well below this mark, with only 2,300 average 
weekday boardings as of March 2016 (Khut 2016).
Kansas City, Missouri
The Troost Avenue MAX is a 13-mile BRT-lite service operated by the Kansas City 
Area Transportation Authority (KCATA). Following the successful implementation of 
the MAX bus rapid transit line along Main Street in July 2005, KCATA began pursuing 
implementation of a second line along Troost Avenue, roughly one mile west of and 
parallel to the existing Main Street MAX line. As of 2007, the Main Street MAX line 
had resulted in a 20% growth in ridership along the Main Street corridor, and planners 
expected similar results from the new Troost Avenue line (FTA 2007). The Troost 
Avenue MAX opened in January 2011 and features dedicated bus lanes, traffic signal 
prioritization, branded buses and stations.
Projected capital costs for the line were $30.73 million (FTA 2007), with actual capital 
costs at $30.6 million (KCATA 2010). Projected ridership was 9,000 average weekday 
boardings after the first year of service (FTA 2007). This proved to be reasonably 
accurate, with actual ridership at 8,500 average weekday boardings following one year of 
service (KCATA 2012).
Las Vegas, Nevada
Since opening the MAX BRT line along North Las Vegas Boulevard in 2004, RTC Transit 
has developed an extensive express bus network that extends across much of the city, 
with multiple lines that incorporate varying features of BRT service. Notable additions 
to the system include the launch of the Strip & Downtown Express (SDX) service in 
2010, the Boulder Highway Express service in 2011, and the Sahara Express service in 
2012. Of these four lines, only the Sahara Express had reliable documentation of cost 
and ridership projections readily available for this analysis.
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The Sahara Express is a 12-mile BRT line that opened in May 2012 and features sheltered 
stops with raised-level boarding, dedicated bus lanes along most of the route, double-
decker buses, traffic signal priority, and landscaping improvements and widened 
sidewalks along the corridor. Projected capital costs were $43.56 million (RTCSNV 2009), 
with actual capital costs at $45.2 million. Projected ridership was 13,900 average daily 
boardings in 2013 (RTCSNV 2009). Actual ridership fell short of this projection, with only 
10,000 average daily boardings in 2012 (Christensen 2012), with those figures remaining 
largely consistent through reported figures in April 2013 and April 2014 (RTCSNV 2014).
Los Angeles, California
The Orange Line is a BRT line operated by the Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority, better known as Metro. An initial 14-mile segment opened 
in October 2005, with a 4-mile extension opening in June 2012. The Orange Line is 
regarded as one of the first “true” BRT systems in the US and uses a dedicated roadway 
along a former Southern Pacific Railroad branch line through the San Fernando Valley. 
The line features dedicated stations, pre-boarding fare payment, and a bikeway along 
the initial segment.
Projected capital costs were $340.4 million for the initial segment (Metro 2003) and 
$135 million for the extension (Guccione 2006; Callaghan and Vincent 2007). Actual 
capital costs were $323.6 million for the initial segment, with an extra $26 million for 
an additional station that opened in December 2006 (Callaghan and Vincent 2007) and 
$154 million for the extension (Bloomekatz 2012).
Projected ridership was 5,000 to 7,500 average weekday boardings for the first year of 
service and 22,000 average weekday boardings by 2020 on the initial segment (Callaghan 
and Vincent 2007). Actual ridership far outpaced these projections, with 21,828 average 
weekday boardings in May 2006 (Callaghan and Vincent 2007), a figure that grew to 
nearly 24,000 average weekday boardings in October 2010 and 26,614 average weekday 
boardings in October 2011 (Hymon 2012). Prior to completion of the extension, Metro 
projected that the entire line including the extension would carry 45,000 daily riders 
by 2030 (Anderson 2012); whether this goal will be met remains to be seen, but average 
weekday Orange Line ridership rose from 26,670 in May 2012, one month prior to 
completion of the extension, to 31,780 in October 2013.5 
Minneapolis, Minnesota
The METRO Red Line is an 11-mile BRT-lite service operated by Metro Transit. It 
opened in June 2013 and uses bus-only shoulder lanes between the Twin City suburbs 
of Bloomington and Apple Valley, with plans for a further extension south to the 
community of Lakeville.
The project was faced with construction setbacks, and the phasing of the project 
changed over time. The original plan was to implement the full Bloomington-Lakeville 
5 Information obtained through personal communication with D. Mieger, December 18, 2013.
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project in four phases with various elements of capital and operating investment in each 
phase. However, the most recent plan changed the investment strategy to three phases 
and altered the timing of the elements included in each stage. Operational costs for the 
system were cut back during construction, causing the initial roll-out of the system to 
be scaled back to a less-frequent service than originally planned. Projected capital costs 
under this revised plan were $118 million, with the actual capital cost at $112 million.6 
Projected ridership was initially 2,250 average daily boardings, with a revised figure of 
960 average daily boardings in the first year of service, following the reduction in service 
plans.7 Actual ridership was 975 average daily boardings in August 2014 (Van Berkel 
2014), comparable to the revised figure but well below the initial projection.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
The West Busway is a 5-mile dedicated busway used by the Port Authority of Allegheny 
County. Completed in 2000, the busway was originally planned to be 8.1 miles long and 
projected to cost $328.8 million to build (FTA 2003). However, the estimate rose to $515 
million following issues with land acquisition from freight rail company CONRAIL and 
problems with the development of a proposed new HOV bridge over the Monongahela 
River into Downtown Pittsburgh. Ultimately, the CONRAIL land acquisition and 
proposed bridge elements were abandoned from the plan, and the project was scaled 
down from 8.1 miles to 5 miles, bringing the actual capital costs for the revised project 
down to $326.8 million (FTA 2003), technically within the projected cost for the project 
but only after these significant changes to the proposal were made. Projected ridership 
for the busway was 7,000 riders per day (FTA 2003), with actual weekday ridership 
being more than 8,700 riders in October 2002 (FTA 2003) and growing to a peak daily 
ridership of 10,000 in 2004 (Vincent 2004) before leveling off in later years.
Another Port Authority of Allegheny County busway project in Pittsburgh was the East 
Busway Swissvale extension, a 2.3-mile extension of the East Busway that was completed 
in 2003. Projected capital costs for the extension were $62.8 million (FTA 1998), with 
actual capital costs being $68.8 million (Grata 2003). Projected ridership for the project 
was an additional 3,800 daily riders on the East Busway by 2005 (FTA 1998). Instead, 
there were only an additional 2,000 daily riders as of 2004 (Vincent 2004), with ridership 
falling since, dropping from an average of 30,000 daily riders in 2004 (Vincent 2004) 
to 25,600 in 2011 (Weinstock et al. 2011). The fall in ridership along the East Busway 
occurred at a time when annual ridership had fallen overall for the Port Authority of 
Allegheny County, dropping from 66 million passenger trips in 2001 to 63.8 million in 
2011 (NTD 2002 and 2012).
6 Information obtained through personal communication with C. Hiniker, December 17, 2013.
7 Ibid.
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Reno, Nevada
The RTC RAPID is a 4.5-mile BRT-lite line operated by the Regional Transportation 
Commission of Washoe County (RTC). The service opened in Fall 2009, with additional 
phases completed in 2011 and 2013 that added more specialized BRT elements, and it 
currently features articulated buses, traffic signal priority, branded stations, floor-level 
boarding platforms, and off-board fare collection.
Projected capital costs for the system were $13.43 million, with actual capital costs 
at $15.35 million.8 Projected ridership for the line was 2,660,000 boardings along the 
served corridor in FY 2010 and 3,079,283 boardings in FY 2013. Actual ridership fell 
short of these projections, with only 1,665,702 boardings along the served corridor in 
FY 2010 and 1,822,018 in FY 2013.9 Following the Great Recession, there was a system-
wide reduction in ridership and service cuts, resulting in falling ridership along the 
corridor served by RTC RAPID in its opening years. Ridership along the corridor failed 
to reach FY 2007 levels (prior to introduction of the RTC RAPID) until FY 2012. Since 
introduction of the RTC RAPID service, ridership has grown by almost 10% in the 
corridor, a modest increase but still falling below early projections.10
San Antonio, Texas
VIA Primo is a 20-mile BRT-lite service operated by VIA Metropolitan Transit. Opened 
in December 2012, the service features branded stations and vehicles and a traffic signal 
priority system. Projected capital costs for the system were $40.1 million, with actual 
capital costs being $35 million. Projected ridership was 5,000 to 8,000 average daily 
riders following one year of service. Actual ridership fell within this range, with 5,800 
average daily riders following one year of service.11
San Bernardino, California
The sbX Green Line is a 15.7-mile BRT line operated by Omnitrans. Opened for service 
in April 2014, the line features dedicated bus lanes for portions of the route, sheltered 
stations with platform-level boarding and ticket vending machines, and branded service.
Projected capital costs for the line were $191.7 million (FTA 2010), which proved 
accurate judging from reports following completion (Starcic 2015). Projected ridership 
was 5,600 average daily boardings within opening year (FTA 2010). Actual ridership fell 
well short of this mark, with only 2,300 average daily boardings as of June 2015 (Wall 
2015). Omnitrans officials have pointed to delays in the opening of a new transit center 
in Downtown San Bernardino, which originally was planned to open in tandem with the 
8 Information obtained through personal communication E. Park, January 27, 2014.
9 Information obtained through personal communication R. Henson, February 26, 2014.
10 Ibid.
11 Information obtained through personal communication with J. Aguilera, February 7, 2014.
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launch of the Green Line, as a factor in the line’s low first year ridership (Wall 2015). The 
transit center finally opened in September 2015.
San Diego, California
The Mid-City Rapid, also branded the Rapid 215, is a 10-mile BRT-lite line operated by 
the Metropolitan Transit System (MTS). Service began in October 2014 and features 
dedicated travel lanes along a small portion of the route, distinctive sheltered stations, a 
traffic signal priority system, and specially-branded articulated buses.
Projected capital costs for the service were $43.3 million (FTA 2008). Actual capital 
costs were $44 million (SANDAG 2014). Projected ridership was initially 15,000 average 
daily boardings upon opening (FTA 2008), although this figure was revised to 7,000 to 
9,000 average daily boardings before the opening of the project (Keatts 2014). Actual 
ridership seems to have fallen short of this mark, with only 6,500 average daily boardings 
as of June 2015 (Schaver 2015). More recent ridership data have not been made publicly 
available as of this writing; without figures from after a full year of service, ridership data 
have been excluded from the final analysis.
Snohomish County, Washington
Swift is a 16.7-mile BRT-lite service operated by Community Transit. Opened in 
November 2009, the service features seven miles of transit-only lanes, traffic signal 
priority, articulated buses, and branded stations with pre-boarding fare collection.
Projected capital costs were $15–20 million (Community Transit 2005), with actual 
capital costs turning out to be $29 million, with 4 stations included in the original plan 
deferred until 2011 due to funding issues (Community Transit 2011). Projected ridership 
was 2,500 average weekday boardings after one year of service and 4,000 average 
weekday boardings after four years of service (Duke 2010). Actual ridership exceeded 
these projections, with 3,500 average weekday boardings after one year of service (Duke 
2010), and 4,400 average weekday boardings after four years of service (Munguia 2013). 
Swift ridership grew despite a system-wide reduction in ridership (Munguia 2010) and 
service cuts in 2010 and 2012, which reduced service frequency and operating hours for 
the BRT service (Munguia 2012). Annual ridership for Community Transit dropped from 
11.4 million in 2009 to 9.1 million in 2012 (NTD 2010, 2013).
The following table summarizes the above case studies, comparing the predicted and 
actual costs in constant US dollars per mile and the predicted and actual ridership. 
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TABLE 1.  Summary of Individual Case Studies
*Original West Busway proposal was an 8.1-mile project. 
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Results
The BRT projects studied generally had more accurate cost estimates than the urban rail 
projects studied by Flyvbjerg. Of the 19 projects for which adequate cost information 
could be obtained, the actual capital costs of 10 came within 5% of their projected cost, 
and 16 came within 15% of their projected cost. However, although there was a high 
number of accurate or nearly accurate cost forecasts, the data also show a propensity 
towards projects coming in over their estimated budget, with 7 exceeding the projected 
cost by at least 5%, compared to only 2 that underestimated it by at least 5% (Figure 1). 
Of the projects described, the two that were far over budget (by at least 15%) were BRT-
lite systems that had such low capital costs that even a difference of a few million dollars 
had a large proportional effect.
FIGURE 1.
Distribution of actual cost as 
percentage of predicted cost
When it comes to ridership estimates, however, the overall picture is much different. Of 
the 16 projects for which adequate ridership data could be obtained, only 2 came within 
10% of their projected ridership. The ridership projections also showed a propensity 
towards being over the actual ridership figures, with 8 projects seeing ridership at least 
10% below what was projected versus only 6 seeing ridership at least 10% above the 
estimates (Figure 2).
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Discussion
Whereas there was a propensity towards projects coming in over budget among the 
systems studied, the level of accuracy shown suggests that BRT projects in the US do 
not suffer from the same level of cost estimate inaccuracies as the urban rail projects 
studied by Flyvbjerg or FTA. In general, the accuracy of the estimated costs for these 
systems was very good.
However, although there was a high level of accuracy in the cost estimates, it is worth 
noting that in a few cases these BRT projects came within budget only due to a scaling 
back of the project from what was initially proposed. This was particularly evident 
in the case of the Western Busway in Pittsburgh, where the scope of the project was 
significantly reduced, and to a lesser extent with the HealthLine in Cleveland, when the 
expense of certain design elements was scaled back.
The ridership estimates, on the other hand, not only showed a high level of inaccuracy 
but also a clear propensity towards predicting ridership higher than the actual results. 
This shows that current ridership forecasting methods still leave something to be 
desired and suggests that many US public transit agencies may be too optimistic as to 
the ridership outcomes of their BRT projects. In some cases, the underperformance of 
these projects has been attributed to outside factors; in San Bernardino, for instance, 
delays in the opening of a new transit center were blamed for their BRT system’s low 
initial ridership. 
A common theme among several of these projects was the effect of the Great Recession 
on ridership: in Cleveland, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, and Reno, overall transit ridership 
 FIGURE 2.
Distribution of actual 
ridership as percentage of 
predicted ridership
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dropped as a result of the recession and subsequent cuts to transit service, which likely 
was a factor in causing new BRT projects in these cities to fail to live up to ridership 
expectations. However, the recession cannot account for all of the underperforming 
systems included here; some of the newest systems studied, such as those in El Paso, 
Grand Rapids, and San Bernardino, performed below expectations despite the fact that 
their ridership estimates were generated well after the start of the Great Recession. 
Additionally, there is little to suggest that ridership forecasts have gotten more accurate 
over time (Figure 3).
FIGURE 3.
Accuracy of ridership 
forecasts by year
It is worth noting that ridership alone is not the only measure of success that can be 
applied to a public transportation infrastructure project, and, with few exceptions, the 
figures shown here reflect only the initial years of operating service. But transportation 
professionals should strive for a high degree of accuracy when discussing the potential 
benefits of a public transportation project, especially if they seek public confidence 
to expand public transportation infrastructure and service in the US in the years to 
come. It is not the intent of this research to question the worthiness of any of these BRT 
projects, but to note that a very common failing is occurring in the process of justifying 
these projects.
When applying for federal funding from FTA, three approaches can be taken to 
provide a ridership forecast: 1) using a region-wide travel model, 2) using incremental 
data-driven methods, which rely on existing ridership data and make projections by 
estimating the effects of proposed or expected changes, or 3) using FTA’s Simplified 
Trips-on-Project Software (STOPS) created by FTA, a simplified version of the standard 
four-step travel model (FTA 2016). When creating ridership projections for future years, 
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all three of these approaches rely on data input by local or regional agencies, including 
expected population and employment patterns. This brings us to a key weakness with 
standard travel forecasting methods: local governments and agencies in the US tend to 
be optimistic about future growth in population, employment, and transit ridership in 
their communities.
In his work, Flyvbjerg advocated for the adoption of “reference class forecasting,” in 
which an outside view of a proposed project would be enforced by comparing it to 
the outcomes of a reference group of similar projects (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005). Although 
there are inherent difficulties in determining which projects serve as adequate reference 
points and compensating for the unique characteristics of any single project, such 
an approach would avoid many of the drawbacks of current standard approaches, in 
particular the tendency towards optimistic future growth forecasts. With a growing 
number of BRT projects in the US, there is a growing reference class of projects to use.
Flyvbjerg also pointed out that current funding mechanisms, in which transportation 
projects across the country compete against each other for crucial federal funding, 
create an incentive for local planners to oversell the benefits of their projects (Flyvbjerg 
et al. 2005). This could be addressed either by adopting different funding mechanisms, 
in which transportation projects do not have to compete directly against each other at 
the federal level, or by applying more rigorous scrutiny to ridership forecasts, perhaps by 
comparing them to similar projects as suggested above.
Conclusions
In recent years, BRT has become an increasingly-common option for local and regional 
agencies when investing in public transit infrastructure. The results of this analysis show 
that BRT projects in the US do very well when holding to their cost projections, but fall 
short where it comes to ridership projections. Although they skewed slightly towards 
being completed over budget, the cost estimates of the BRT projects studied tended to 
be far more accurate than the urban rail projects Flyvbjerg studied. But the widespread 
inaccuracy of the ridership estimates among the projects studied demonstrates 
that a more critical eye should be directed towards ridership projections. Although 
there is much inherent difficulty in accurately predicting future transit ridership, the 
tendency towards overestimating ridership shown here suggests a bias similar to that 
demonstrated by Flyvbjerg’s research.
BRT offers an excellent opportunity for many communities to invest in high-quality 
public transportation. However, the results of this research suggest that there may be a 
tendency to oversell the benefits of these projects. With many new BRT projects under 
construction and opening in the years to come, it is important that transportation 
professionals apply more rigorous methodology to the ridership projections for these 
projects.
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